Strategic Compensation: Does Business Strategy Influence Compensation in High-Technology Firms? by Yanadori, Yoshio & Marler, Janet  H.
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
CAHRS Working Paper Series Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies (CAHRS) 
1-1-2003 
Strategic Compensation: Does Business Strategy Influence 
Compensation in High-Technology Firms? 
Yoshio Yanadori 
Cornell University 
Janet H. Marler 
University at Albany - S.U.N.Y, marler@albany.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cahrswp 
 Part of the Human Resources Management Commons 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies 
(CAHRS) at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in CAHRS Working Paper Series by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Strategic Compensation: Does Business Strategy Influence Compensation in 
High-Technology Firms? 
Abstract 
This study examined whether a firm's business strategy influences the firm's compensation systems in 
high-technology firms. For the firm strategy variable, we used innovation strategy, which is one of the 
most critical business strategies in the high-technology industry. Our analysis showed that a firm's 
emphasis on innovation is positively related to the firm's employee pay level, both short-term pay and 
long-term pay. Moreover, a firm's emphasis on innovation has significant influence on several other 
aspects of employee compensation management. Innovation is positively associated with the difference 
in pay level between R&D employees and other employees, time orientation of employee compensation 
(the relative emphasis on long-term pay to short-term pay), and the length of the stock option vesting 
period. The influence of innovation is significant after controlling for industry membership. 
Keywords 
organization, performance, practices, research, firm, industry, innovation, compensation, employee, pay, 
R&D 
Disciplines 
Human Resources Management 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Yanadori, Y. & Marler, J. H. (2003). Strategic compensation: does business strategy influence 
compensation in high-technology firms? (CAHRS Working Paper #03-03). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies. 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cahrswp/26/ 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cahrswp/26 
  
 
 
 
W O R K I N G  P A P E R  S E R I E S   
 
 
Strategic Compensation:  Does Business 
Strategy Influence Compensation in High-
Technology Firms? 
 
 
Yoshio Yanadori 
Janet H. Marler 
 
 
Working Paper 03 – 03 
      
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CAHRS / Cornell University 
187 Ives Hall 
Ithaca, NY  14853-3901  USA 
Tel.  607 255-9358 
www.ilr.cornell.edu/CAHRS/ 
 
Strategic Compensation  CAHRS WP03-03 
                                         
 
 Page 2 
 
 
Strategic Compensation:   
Does Business Strategy Influence 
Compensation in High-Technology Firms? 
 
 
 
 
Yoshio Yanadori 
ILR School 
Cornell University 
393 Ives Hall 
Ithaca, NY14853-3901 
Tel: (607) 255-7622 
Fax: (607) 255-1836 
yy40@cornell.edu 
 
 
 
Janet H. Marler 
Assistant Professor of Management 
School of Business 
University at Albany - S.U.N.Y 
1400 Washington Ave 
Albany, NY12222 
Tel: (518) 442-4966 
marler@albany.edu 
 
 
January, 2003 
 
 
 
 
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/cahrs 
 
This paper has not undergone formal review or approval of the faculty of the ILR School.  It is 
intended to make results of Center research available to others interested in preliminary form to 
encourage discussion and suggestions. 
 
Most (if not all) of the CAHRS Working Papers are available for reading at the Catherwood 
Library.  For information on what’s available link to the Cornell Library Catalog: 
http://catalog.library.cornell.edu if you wish. 
 
 
Strategic Compensation  CAHRS WP03-03 
                                         
 
 Page 3 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study examined whether a firm's business strategy influences the firm's 
compensation systems in high-technology firms. For the firm strategy variable, we used 
innovation strategy, which is one of the most critical business strategies in the high-technology 
industry. Our analysis showed that a firm's emphasis on innovation is positively related to the 
firm's employee pay level, both short-term pay and long-term pay. Moreover, a firm's emphasis 
on innovation has significant influence on several other aspects of employee compensation 
management. Innovation is positively associated with the difference in pay level between R&D 
employees and other employees, time orientation of employee compensation (the relative 
emphasis on long-term pay to short-term pay), and the length of the stock option vesting period. 
The influence of innovation is significant after controlling for industry membership. 
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Strategic Compensation: 
Does Business Strategy Influence Compensation in High-
Technology Firms? 
 
A strategic perspective on compensation management claims that a firm's compensation  
system should be tailored such that it supports the firm's business strategy (Milkovich & 
Newman, 2002). Its premise is that good fit, or alignment, between a firm's business strategy 
and its human resource management system, including the compensation system, leads to 
better firm performance (e.g., Gerhart, 2000). Given this premise, both researchers and 
practitioners suggest that a firm's business strategy should be a key determinant of the firm's 
compensation system. Consequently, firms pursuing different business strategies develop 
different compensation systems. Indeed, Gerhart and Milkovich (1990) reported that firms' pay 
systems (e.g., pay level, pay mix) were different even after controlling for employee human 
capital (e.g., education, tenure) and firm characteristics (e.g., size, profitability, industry), and 
moreover, the differences were stable across time. 
 There is much anecdotal and prescriptive information concerning which business 
strategy fits better with which compensation system. For instance, increasing variable pay 
portion is supposed to be a more appropriate compensation strategy for firms that pursue a 
competitive advantage through cost efficiency because the pay scheme helps the firms control 
their labor costs (e.g. Milkovich & Newman, 2002). Ellig (1981) argues that a firm's 
compensation system should change according to the firm's change in market cycle. The 
empirical evidence on such relationships, however, is still evolving. Pitts (1976) confirmed that 
diversified firms were more likely to link employee pay with business unit performance, whereas 
less diversified firms were more likely to link employee pay with corporate performance. Several 
studies have reported that a certain combination of a firm's business strategy and pay system 
leads to better organization performance (e.g., Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992; Montemayor, 
1996; Rajagopalan, 1996). Yet the evidence is still equivocal in support of any systematic 
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relationship between a certain business strategy and a particular compensation system. The 
paucity of research is particularly evident in relation to high-technology firms, which play a key 
role in the U.S. economy.  
 The purpose of this study is the investigation of such systematic relationships in high-
technology firms. Using non-executive employees' compensation data from about 250 
organizations in the high-technology industry, we examine whether a certain business strategy 
is associated with several dimensions of compensation strategy. In this study, we focus on 
innovation strategy, which is one of the most critical business strategies for high-technology 
firms (Balkin, Markman, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000; Hill & Snell, 1988). Building on Balkin et al. 
(2000), who reported a positive relationship between a firm's emphasis on innovation and the 
size of CEO pay in high-technology firms, this study examines the pay for non-executive 
employees. We will show that the influence of innovation strategy on compensation goes 
beyond CEO pay. Non executive-level employee compensation is also influenced by innovation 
strategy in high-technology firms.  
 Furthermore, while Balkin et al. (2000) focused on pay level, our study examines the 
effects of a firm's innovation strategy on several dimensions of the firm's total compensation 
strategy. To do this, we investigate not only pay level, but also internal pay structure (i.e., the 
differences in pay level across different employee groups), pay mix, and the design of each pay 
form. As suggested by Gerhart (2000), looking at multiple dimensions of compensation 
management will more accurately describe the array of a firm's compensation decisions. It is 
notable that some of these dimensions have been quite underdeveloped. Specifically, we 
introduce "time orientation" of employee compensation, a new concept in pay mix, which refers 
to the relative emphasis on long-term pay to short-term pay. We will argue that this measure is 
relevant particularly when we examine the relationship between innovation strategy and 
employee compensation in high-technology firms. Concerning pay plan designs, we examine 
the lengths of the stock option vesting period. Given the limited research on stock option vesting 
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periods, our investigation of the determinants of vesting period lengths contributes to our 
knowledge in compensation management.  
 We also incorporate possible effects of institutional factors. Relying on institutional 
theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996), we examine whether a firm's 
compensation system is influenced by institutionalized norms within an industry. Specifically, we 
test whether a firm's pay mix policy and the length of the vesting period of stock options are 
shaped by market industry competitors’ practices. Our "high-technology firms" dataset consists 
of firms in several sub-industries (e.g., computer hardware, semi-conductor, computer software). 
We show that the membership of these sub-industries needs to be taken into account when we 
investigate a firm's choice of compensation strategies. 
 This study leverages the multi-level nature of our data. Our compensation data includes 
detailed non-executive-level, individual employee compensation information from firms in the 
high-technology industry. We merge firm information (e.g., size, performance, innovation 
strategy) and industry membership with our compensation data. It allows us to analyze the 
effects of a firm's business strategy on employee compensation from three different levels: 
individual-level, firm-level, and industry-level. We use hierarchical linear models with three 
levels for our hypothesis testing. 
  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
High-Technology Firms and Innovation Strategy  
According to Porter (1980), to effectively compete in the market, firms must position 
themselves appropriately. Porter suggested that there are three major types of positioning: cost 
leadership, product differentiation, and focus. Among these, product differentiation seeks a 
competitive advantage by providing unique values to customers that competitors cannot. A 
technological innovation, which often results in the generation of new products, obviously 
enables firms to provide customers additional value. Hence, emphasizing innovation can be 
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regarded as one effective differentiation strategy. In addition, emphasis on the innovation 
strategy may support firms that use cost leadership strategy, too. This strategy pursues a 
competitive advantage through continuous cost reduction. Innovation in production will 
substantially lower a firm's production cost, which gives the firm a competitive cost advantage. 
Pursuing an innovation strategy, therefore, is an effective way to successfully position a firm's 
products in Porter's framework. 
 A decade later, the resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1990) claimed that the 
resources that are valuable, rare, inimitable, and substitutable can be a source of sustained 
competitive advantage. Because being technologically innovative potentially satisfies all four 
criteria (Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2001; Balkin et al, 2000), a firm's effort to acquire such 
innovative capability is a legitimate firm activity to compete in the market. Being innovative is 
effective particularly for firms in the high-technology industry (Hill & Snell, 1988). Successful 
new product development results in high profit margin. New products often create a whole new 
market, which the inventor can exploit until its competitors catch up to its technology. Even 
when the competitors catch up, the inventor will be able to enjoy the revenue from licensing new 
technologies (Arora et al, 2001). 
 Given that innovation strategy is one promising strategic direction for firms in the high-
technology industry, the most straightforward action for firms that pursue innovation strategy is 
to increase their R&D investments, which should improve the firm's technological advantage. To 
exploit the positive effects of R&D investments, the firm’s management practices must support 
its strategic decision making. The management that believes that HR practices need to support 
the firm's business strategy will tailor the firm's HR practices accordingly. Consequently, the 
differences in a firm's orientation to R&D will lead to differences in the firm's HR practices, 
including compensation practices. 
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Pay Level  
Balkin et al. (2000) reported that a firm's innovation strategy had positive effects on the 
firm's CEO compensation, both short-term (i.e., salary and bonus) and long-term pay. Although 
innovation strategy has the potential to enable increased profitability, it is inherently risky 
because the investment for developing new products is not always successful (Baysinger, 
Kosnik, & Turk, 1991). Given an agency theory assumption that agents (or CEOs) are risk-
averse (Eisenhardt, 1988; Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia, & Fugate, 2000), agents will be less willing 
to make R&D investments, which increase their level of risk, considering the likelihood of 
unsuccessful investments. In contrast, R&D investments are more attractive to principals (or 
stockholders), who are less risk-averse (Baysinger et al., 1991). Moreover, for principals of high-
technology firms, R&D investments are critical for gaining a competitive advantage, and thus 
they try to set a compensation system that motivates their CEOs to commit to R&D investments. 
Accordingly, Balkin et al. (2000) argued that the level of CEO compensation should be 
associated with a firm's commitment to innovation including R&D investments. Their statistical 
analyses using CEO compensation data in 1993 and 1994 supported their argument. A firm's 
commitment to innovation had significant positive effects on the level of CEO short-term and 
long-term pay. 
 We argue that a similar rationale can be applied to managers below the CEO. Both the 
CEO and shareholders will want to provide the same incentives to non-executive employees. 
Stockholders, who want to increase R&D expenditure for strengthening their firm's future 
technological advantage may opt to arrange the non-executive employee compensation system 
such that it encourages consistent support for the increase in R&D investments among non-
executive employees. In addition, given the significant positive relationship between a firm's 
innovation strategy and the CEO's compensation, the CEO may be motivated to strengthen the 
link between a firm's innovation strategy and non-executive employee pay level because it 
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encourages its non-executive employees to support the CEO's decision to increase R&D 
spending, which eventually increases the CEO’s pay. 
 However, the effect of increased R&D investments on firms’ performance variability, 
employees' income risk, and employment stability may motivate employees to behave in 
unanticipated ways that are in fact undesirable for the firm (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998). To offset 
increasing risk, one compensation scheme to alleviate the situation is to pay risk premiums. 
Increasing employee pay level (i.e., providing risk premiums) compensates for the employees' 
increased income and employment risk. Consequently, a firm's innovation strategy will have a 
positive effect on the pay level for non-executive employees in high-technology firms. 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Innovation strategy has a positive effect on non-executive employee pay 
level in high-technology firms. 
 
Pay Structure 
Pay structure is defined as "the array of pay rates for different work or skills within a 
single organization." (Milkovich & Newman, 2002: 59) Although past researchers have been 
interested in the differences in pay level across job levels (e.g., Bloom, 1999), it also includes 
the difference in pay among employees in different job families (e.g., Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 
1987). This study focuses on the difference in pay level between job families. 
 Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Slancik, 1978) argues that organization 
decisions are influenced by both internal and external agents that control critical resources for 
the organizations. According to this theory, organizations must acquire resources (e.g., money, 
technology, accreditation from regulatory agencies) to survive, and they interact with other 
actors who control such resources. The actors who control such resources, either internally or 
externally, have considerable influences over the organizations. With regard to internal agents, 
certain positions are more important because they secure valuable resources, and research 
shows that employees holding such positions are paid more (Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1987; 
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Pfeffer, Davis-Blake, & Julius, 1995). For instance, Pfeffer and Davis-Blake (1987) show that 
officers who play an important role in raising money (e.g., chief development officer, admissions 
director) are paid comparatively more in private academic institutions than in public academic 
institutions. In contrast, the officers that play an important role in maintaining a good relationship 
with the community (e.g., director of community services, chief public relations officer) are paid 
more in public academic institutions. More recently, Carpenter and Wade (2002) researched the 
interaction between executives' functional position, their firms' strategic resource allocation, and 
cash compensation for the executives. They found that the relative cash pay level of executives 
in R&D increased as their firms' allocated more resources to R&D. 
 In high-technology firms that pursue a competitive advantage through innovation, the 
most important resource is the ability to produce innovative outcomes. Compared to other 
employees, those in R&D positions are obviously a key resource. They have the potential to 
make the greatest contribution to the firm's success. The importance of R&D employees, as 
compared with other groups, increases as the firm's emphasis on innovation increases. 
Consequently, the difference in pay level between R&D employees and other employee groups 
will increase as the firm increases R&D investments. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Innovation strategy moderates the relationship between employee group 
and employee pay level in high-technology firms such that the greater the emphasis on 
innovation, the greater the difference in pay level between R&D employees and other 
employee groups. 
 
Pay Mix 
Pay mix, which is defined as “relative emphasis among compensation components” 
(Milkovich & Newman, 2002: 664), is an important dimension of compensation strategy (Gerhart, 
2000; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990). A review of past pay mix studies shows that virtually all 
studies are based on agency theory, and examine the proportion of one pay form, variable pay 
(e.g., the ratio of bonus to base pay, the ratio of long-term incentives to total pay, etc.) across 
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managerial compensation packages (e.g., Anderson, Banker, & Ravindran, 2000; Werner & 
Tosi, 1995). In this study, however, we examine another more relevant pay mix concept, "time 
orientation," which refers to the relative emphasis on long-term pay in employee compensation 
packages as compared with short-term pay.  Some pay forms are based on short-term results 
(e.g., merit pay, annual bonus), while other pay forms are based on long-term outcomes (e.g., 
stock options, stock grants).  Agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and 
expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) argue that employees maximize their utility by focusing not 
only on the amount of incentives, but also on the criteria for earning it. Thus, compensation 
criteria that place greater emphasis on long-term pay, as compared with short-term pay, will 
motivate behavior and align the interest of employees to achieve long-term performance goals 
more than short-term performance goals.  
 The concept of time orientation is relevant to our investigation of the relationship 
between a firm's innovation strategy and employee compensation mix because it takes many 
years for the firms to actualize benefits from their investments on R&D. An innovation strategy 
may require maximizing long-term profitability by sacrificing short-term performance (David, Hitt, 
& Gimeno, 2001). Thus, compensation time frames need to reflect these important differences 
or else risk invoking inconsistent employee behaviors (Hoskisson, Hitt, & Hill, 1993). 
Consequently, we hypothesize that a firm's innovation strategy is positively associated with 
long-term time orientation of employee compensation. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Innovation strategy has a positive effect on time-orientation of employee 
compensation in high-technology firms. 
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Stock Option Plan Design 
This study argues that a firm's innovation strategy also influences the design of each pay 
plan. One relevant pay plan design to a firm's innovation strategy is the length of stock option 
vesting period. Vesting period refers to "the amount of time it takes for an option to become 
exercisable” (National Center for Employee Ownership, 1998). Recipients of stock options 
usually have to wait a certain number of years before exercising options. Because recipients 
can benefit financially only after exercising options, the vesting period shifts recipients' attention 
to firm performance beyond the vesting period. The longer the vesting period, the longer the 
time frame of stock options. The survey by NCEO (2001) shows that vesting periods range 
generally from one year to seven years. Four years is the most common vesting period both for 
management and non-management. To our knowledge, no study has ever investigated the 
determinants of the length of the stock option vesting period. 
 The discussion on the relationship between innovation strategy and stock option vesting 
period length is essentially the same as the previous section, which claims that the relationship 
between innovation strategy and time orientation of employee compensation must be consistent. 
We argue that innovation strategy will be executed effectively when the interests of employees 
are aligned with their firms' long-term performance. Consequently, the emphasis on innovation 
should be associated with stock option plan designs that feature a longer vesting period.  
 
Hypothesis 4:  Innovation strategy has a positive effect on the length of the vesting period 
of stock options in high-technology firms. 
 
Institutional Factors 
While we hypothesize that a firm's business strategy influences the firm's compensation 
strategy, theory and evidence suggest that firms also consider their competitors' behaviors. 
Institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) argues that organizations 
adopt a prevailing structure even if it is not necessarily the most effective, or if it does not fit with 
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the organizations' business strategy or external environment. This is because the adoption of 
popular practices enables the organizations to enhance their legitimacy, which reduces 
uncertainty and secures resources necessary for their survival. Researchers have applied this 
theory in explaining the diffusion of particular human resource practices (Wright & McMahan, 
1994). Westphal and Zajac (1994) examined the adoption of long-term incentive plans for 
corporate executives from 1971 through 1990. Barringer and Milkovich (1998) suggested that 
institutional theory would explain the adoption of flexible benefits. 
 Because the process of institutionalization includes organization comparison with its 
product market competitors (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996), the extent to which a certain practice is 
adopted and institutionalized varies across product market industries. Indeed, Eisenhardt (1989) 
reported that the use of sales commission was more common in shoe sales than in other 
segments of the retailing industry. Consequently, the adoption of various pay forms, the design 
of each pay form, and the mix of different pay forms may also reflect the institutionalized shared 
norm among industries. While our dataset includes firms in the high-technology industry, the 
industry is made up of several sub-industries (e.g., computer hardware, semiconductor, 
computer software), which are regarded as independent. We claim that compensation strategies 
that comprise decisions on pay level, pay structure, pay mix, and design of each pay plan are 
influenced by these sub-industry memberships even after controlling for a firm's business 
strategy, size, performance. This is not to say that firms in the same industry subset choose an 
identical compensation strategy. Our intention is to demonstrate that both a firm's business 
strategy and industry membership simultaneously influence the firm's compensation strategy. 
While compensation strategies are relatively similar among firms in the same sub-industry, firms 
within a sub-industry still exhibit significant differences in their compensation strategies 
reflecting their business strategy.  
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 Labor economists have already shown industry differences in pay level (e.g., Kreuger & 
Summers, 1988), here we posit that compensation strategy, which also encompasses pay mix 
and pay plan design, is influenced by industry membership. 
 
Hypothesis 5a: Industry membership has an influence on the time-orientation of employee 
compensation even after controlling for innovation strategy and other relevant organization 
characteristics.  
 
Hypothesis 5b: Industry membership has an influence on the length of the vesting period 
of stock options after controlling for innovation strategy and other relevant organization 
characteristics. 
 
METHODS 
Data 
The data was obtained from SC/ChiPS’ annual compensation survey, compiled by 
Clark/Bardes, a compensation consulting firm formerly know as Executive Alliance. The 
database contains individual employees’ compensation data as well as information on 
employees’ jobs, job levels, tenure, and office locations for more than 100 companies in the 
high-technology industry (e.g., computer hardware, computer software, telecommunications) for 
the years from 1997 to 2000. While some firms participated in the survey all four years, others 
participated in the survey only three years or less. Despite both public and private firm 
participation in the survey, the scope of this study is limited to public firms due to the difficulty of 
collecting firm-level information (e.g., firm size, performance) on private firms. We also collected 
firm-level information from Standard & Poor's COMPUSTAT. Our data collection effort yielded 
about 980,000 non-executive employees in 259 firm-years (47 firms for 1997, 63 for 1998, 65 
for 1999, and 84 for 2000).  
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Dependent Variables 
To test our hypotheses, we use three dependent variables: pay level, time orientation of 
employee compensation, and the length of the stock option vesting period. We use total pay, 
short-term pay and long-term pay. Total pay includes virtually all forms of monetary (e.g., base 
pay, profit sharing awards) and non-monetary compensation (e.g., stock options, medical 
insurance, perquisites, and other benefits). Monetary values of employee benefit plans 
represent hypothetical values that an employee would need to purchase equivalent plans in the 
marketplace. We use short-term pay and long-term pay as the dependent variable measures of 
pay level to see whether there are any differences in the effect of innovation strategy on the 
levels of these two pay categories whose time orientation is different. Short-term pay includes 
base pay, profit-sharing award, and other short-term incentives (i.e., cash award related to 
annual corporate, division, unit or individual performance). Base pay is regarded as short-term 
pay since it is revised annually or more frequently based on short-term performance and 
increased skill. Long-term pay includes various long-term incentive plans (e.g., stock options, 
stock grants). Total pay is described as the sum of short-term pay, long-term pay, and various 
employee benefit plans. These definitions of short-term pay and long-term pay are consistent 
with Balkin et al. (2000). Since our dataset includes compensation data collected from different 
years (i.e., 1997-2000), the rate of inflation was adjusted using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
Time orientation of employee compensation is measured as the ratio of long-term pay to short-
term pay (in percent). Vesting period is measured in the number of years. As the distributions of 
total pay, short-term pay, long-term pay, and time orientation are skewed, we apply logarithmic 
transformation. 
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Independent Variables 
Innovation strategy.  We use each firm’s R&D intensity as a proxy of innovation 
strategy. R&D intensity is calculated as R&D expenditure (in dollars) divided by the number of 
employees (Baysinger, et al. 1991). While Balkin et al. (2000) used a composite measure 
computed by adding standardized value of R&D spending and number of patents, R&D per 
employee is generally regarded as the best proxy for a firm’s emphasis on innovation (Hill & 
Snell, 1988; Scherer, 1984). The rate of inflation is adjusted using the CPI. As the distribution of 
this variable is skewed, we also apply logarithmic transformation. 
Industry membership.  Firms self-reported their industry membership based on a 
categorization supplied by Clark/Bardes. There are 12 subsets of industry in our dataset, which 
are: computer hardware, semiconductor, PC software, peripheral, communications, defense, 
applied special services, consumer electronics, telecommunication services, storage, 
manufacturing equipment, and others.  
 
Control Variables 
We include several relevant control variables. They are either individual- or firm-level 
variables. 
Individual-level variables.  The first individual-level control variable is job family. Our 
dataset provides three categories of job family: research and development (R&D) jobs, technical 
jobs, and administrative jobs. R&D jobs include semiconductor engineers, CAD engineers, and 
development engineers. Technical jobs include business systems analysts, data base 
specialists, and application programmers. Administrative jobs include finance, legal, and human 
resources. R&D job is measured by an indicator variable; 1 if an employee holds an R&D job 
and 0 otherwise. We also control for employee job level.  There are eight job levels based on 
the scope of jobs and their responsibility. Levels 1-5 are individual contributors, and levels 6-8 
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are managers. The higher the number, the higher the job level. Finally, we include employee 
tenure. It is shown in years in the job.  
Firm-level variables.  Firm-level information is collected from Standard & Poor's 
COMPUSTAT. First we include firm size as a control variable. Researchers agree on the 
positive relationship between firm size and pay level (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2002). Concerning 
pay mix, Zenger and Marshall (2000) reported that bigger firms were less likely to use group-
based incentives. We use the number of employees of the firm for the proxy. We also include 
firm performance. More profitable firms may be able to pay more. In terms of pay mix, Marler, 
Milkovich, and Yanadori (2002) reported that firm performance was positively associated with 
the relative importance of stock options. We use return on assets (ROA) to measure firm 
performance. In addition, we include each firm's stock market price. Stock market price may 
have some influences on the firm's stock option decisions (e.g., how many options should be 
granted, and vesting period). We use each firm's closing stock price in the calendar year. Finally, 
we include a firm's cash flow. Since stock options do not require contemporaneous cash 
payment, firms that are short of cash flow may be motivated to use stock options. Cash flow is 
calculated as: (income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization) / 
(common shares used to calculate earnings per share multiplied by adjustment factor) 
(Standard & Poors, 1994). With regard to firm size, stock market price, and cash flow, the rate 
of inflation is adjusted using the CPI. As the distribution of firm size is skewed, we apply 
logarithmic transformation. 
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Model 
Due to the multi-level structure of our dataset, we use hierarchical linear model (Littell, 
Milliken, Stroup & Wolfinger, 2000; Singer, 1998) to test our hypotheses. The general model is: 
 
Yijk = βjk Xijk  + εijk  (level 1 - Individual) 
βjk = γkZjk + Ujk  (level 2 - Firm) 
γk = τ + Vk  (level 3 - Industry), 
 
where ijk means employee i in firm j in industry k. Yijk are the dependent variable measures for 
individual i in firm j in industry k. Xijk is a matrix of individual-level independent variables and Zjk 
is a matrix of firm-level independent variables. βjk and γk are predictors.   i τ is the industry mean 
of γk. Ujk is a firm-level random effect, and Vk is an industry-level random effect. εijk is an error 
term. Ujk, Vk, and εijk are all assumed to be iid-normal with means 0's and their variances are 
δ2U, δ2V, and δ2ε. We do not include a year variable because our preliminary analysis shows that 
the data year does not have a significant effect. For firm-level independent variables (Zjk), we 
took a one-year lag. For instance, we estimate Total payijk in year t using individual-level 
information in year t and firm-level information in year t-1. More specifically, we use the following 
model.  
 
(Dependent variable)ijk = β0jk + β1jk (R&D Job)ijk + β2 (Job level)ijk + β3 (Tenure)ijk  + εijk 
β0jk = γ00jk + γ01jk(Firm size)jk + γ02jk(Firm performance)jk + γ03jk(Stock market price)jk +   
γ04jk(Cash flow)jk + γ05jk(Innovation)jk + U0jk  
β1jk = γ10jk + γ11jk (Innovation)jk + U1jk  
γ00jk = τ + V00k, 
 
where total pay, short-term pay, and long-term pay are used as the dependent variables for 
Hypothesis 1 and 2, time orientation is used for Hypothesis 3 and 5a, and vesting period is for 
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Hypothesis 4 and 5b. For testing Hypothesis 1, we examine whether γ05jk is positive and 
significant. For testing Hypothesis 2, we examine whether γ11jk is significant and positive. For 
Hypothesis 3 and 4, we test whether γ05jk is positive and significant. For Hypothesis 5b and 5b, 
we test whether V00k is significantly different from zero. 
 
RESULTS 
Table 1 contains a summary of descriptive statistics for our variables, along with their 
intercorrelations. The results of our hierarchical linear model (HLM) analyses that estimate 
employee pay level are presented in Table 2. As already explained, we use three dependent 
variable measures: short-term pay, long-term pay, and total pay. For each dependent variable, 
we ran two models: one we consider the full model, as specified above; the other is the reduced 
model, which does not include the moderating effect of innovation on the relationship between 
R&D job and the three measures of pay levelii. We show results with two different models 
because we think that contrasting two models describes the moderation effect of innovation 
more accurately. The left columns of the two columns for each dependent variable show the 
results of reduced models, and the right columns show the results of full models.  
 The results clearly show that innovation has a significant positive effect on pay level in 
high-technology firms. The coefficients of innovation (γ05) are all positive and significant. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 1, which stated that innovation strategy has a positive effect on non-
executive employee pay level, is supported. Next, we focus on the results of full models 
displayed in the right columns of each dependent variable. The moderation effects of innovation 
on the relationship between R&D job and pay level (γ11) are all positive and significant, which 
supports Hypothesis 2. When we compare the results of the full models (right columns) with 
those of the reduced models (left columns), we recognize that the signs of the effect of R&D job 
(β1j) become negative in the full models, whereas they are positive in the reduced models. The 
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results of the three reduced models suggest that employees holding R&D positions are paid 
more than the other employees in high-technology firms. However, once we take account of the 
moderation effect of innovation on the relationship between R&D job and pay level, we find that 
employees in R&D positions are paid less than the other employees. As far as total pay is 
concerned, the effect of R&D job turns to be positive when innovation is greater than 5.78 (= 0 - 
(-0.191 / 0.033); -0.191 is the coefficient for R&D job (β1j) and 0.033 is the coefficient of the 
moderation effect (γ11)). In fact, none of the firms in our dataset has an innovation measure 
lower than 5.78. Therefore, the effect of R&D job is actually positive.  
 
 
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1.  Total pay* 4.73 0.41
2.  Short term pay* 4.36 0.32 0.86
3.  Long term pay* 1.24 1.74 0.71 0.37
4.  Time orientation* -1.57 9.91 0.59 0.28 0.96
5.  Vesting period 4.17 0.92 0.12 -0.04 0.30 0.34
6.  R&D job 0.44 0.50 0.17 0.21 0.07 0.04 0.04
7.  Job level 3.57 1.60 0.69 0.78 0.27 0.20 -0.14 0.05
8.  Tenure 2.79 1.44 0.12 0.24 -0.12 -0.13 -0.27 -0.07 0.27
9.  Firm size* 11.00 1.31 -0.07 0.02 -0.27 -0.28 -0.11 0.01 -0.02 0.30
10. Firm performance 11.49 1.69 0.19 0.03 0.35 0.35 0.48 0.35 -0.06 -0.20 -0.10
11. Stock market price 49.62 23.23 0.08 -0.02 -0.07 -0.11 0.28 -0.02 -0.06 0.12 0.65 0.27
12. Cash flow 2.59 2.28 -0.18 -0.08 -0.28 0.35 -0.43 0.03 -0.03 0.21 0.53 -0.06
13. Innovation* 10.14 0.72 0.26 0.12 0.37 0.34 0.57 0.06 -0.01 -0.27 -0.40 0.33
1.  N = 980,306. Correlations greater than | 0.002 | indicate p < 0.05.
2.  * indicates the variables are in logarithm.
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Table 2 
Results of Hierarchical Linear Model Analysis on Pay Level 
 
 
 
Pay Level 
Dependent Variables Short-term pay (Base + Bonus) Long-term pay Total Pay 
 Reduced 
Model 
Full 
Model 
Reduced 
Model 
Full 
Model 
Reduced 
Model 
Full 
Model 
(Individual-level variables) 
      
R&D Job (β1j)  0.136*** -0.130*  0.237*** -0.996**  0.135*** -0.191** 
Job Level (β2j)  0.147***  0.147***  0.345***  0.347***  0.175***  0.176*** 
Tenure (β3j)  0.020***  0.020*** -0.030*** -0.033***  0.011***  0.011*** 
 
      
(Firm-level variables) 
      
Firm size (γ01)  0.013**  0.008* -0.165** -0.164** -0.035*** -0.034*** 
Firm Performance (γ02)  0.000  0.000  0.000**  0.000*  0.000  0.000 
Stock market price (γ03)  0.000  0.000  0.016***  0.016***  0.007***  0.007*** 
Cash Flow (γ04) -0.002 -0.002 -0.059 -0.052 -0.024** -0.023** 
Innovation (γ05)  0.055***  0.044***  0.364**  0.321**  0.059**  0.047* 
 
      
(Interaction) 
      
R&D job * Innovation (γ11) -  0.027*** -  0.122*** -  0.033*** 
 
      
 
      
(Random Effects) 
      
Intercept – Firm (Uojk)  0.006***  0.006***  1.111***  1.001***  0.034***  0.030*** 
Intercept – Industry (V00k)  0.002***  0.002***  0.163***  0.159***  0.004***  0.004*** 
R&D job (U1j)   0.004***   0.140***   0.008*** 
 
n = 980,306. 
*** p < .001 
**  p < .01 
*   p < .05 
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Table 3 describes the results of the HLM analyses that estimate time orientation of 
employee compensation and the length of the stock option vesting period. The left column is the 
result of the analysis on time orientation. The effect of innovation on time orientation (γ11) is 
positively significant (p < 0.01), suggesting that innovation strategy increases the emphasis on 
long-term pay relative to short-term pay. This supports Hypothesis 3. The right column of Table 
3 is the result of the analysis that estimates the length of the stock option vesting period. The 
effect of innovation (γ11) is positively significant (p < 0.01), suggesting that innovation strategy 
has the effect of extending the length of the vesting period of stock options granted. This 
supports Hypothesis 4. 
Finally, the random effect of industry (V00k) is significant for time orientation and vesting 
period (p < 0.001 for both). It means that there are significant industry effects on the level of 
time orientation of employee compensation and the length of the stock option vesting period 
even after controlling for innovation strategy and other relevant factors. Therefore, Hypothesis 
5a and 5b are supported. 
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Table 3 
Results of Hierarchical Linear Model Analysis on Pay Mix 
and Stock Option Vesting Period Length 
Dependent Variables Time-orientation Vesting 
(Long-term pay/Short-term pay) Period 
(Individual-level variables) 
R&D Job ( β 1j ) -0.804*** -0.044 
Job level ( β 2j ) 0.293*** 0.003*** 
Tenure ( β 3j
 
) -0.036*** -0.010*** 
(Firm -level variables) 
Firm size ( γ 01 ) -0.178*** 0.017 
Firm performance ( γ 02
 
) 0.000* 0.000*** 
Stock market price ( γ 03 ) 0.016*** -0.000 
Cash flow ( γ 04 ) -0.054 -0.159*** 
Innovation ( γ 05 ) 0.336** 0.305** 
(Interaction) 
R&D job * Innovation ( γ 11 ) 0.099** 0.005 
(Random Effects) 
Intercept - Firm (U ojk ) 1.1915*** 0.777*** 
Intercept - Industry (V 00k ) 0.164*** 0.001*** 
R&D job (U 1j ) 0.141*** 0.001*** 
n = 980,306. 
***  p < .001 
**   p < .01 
*    p < .05 
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DISCUSSION 
This study examined whether a firm's business strategy influences the firm's 
compensation systems in high-technology firms. For the firm strategy variable, we used 
innovation strategy, which is one of the most critical business strategies in the high-technology 
industry. Our analysis showed that a firm's emphasis on innovation is positively related to the 
firm's employee pay level, both short-term pay and long-term pay. Moreover, a firm's emphasis 
on innovation has significant influence on several other aspects of employee compensation 
management. Innovation is positively associated with the difference in pay level between R&D 
employees and other employees, time orientation of employee compensation (the relative 
emphasis on long-term pay to short-term pay), and the length of the stock option vesting period. 
 In addition, we confirmed distinct industry effects on different aspects of compensation 
management. The random effects of product market industry membership are all significant. 
The industry effect on pay level has been repeatedly reported. Scholars explain that it is 
attributed to differences in labor market and production technology that result in the difference in 
productivity across industry groups (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2003; Milkovich & Newman, 2002). In 
contrast, there has been little systematic study of industry differences in pay mix or the length of 
the stock option vesting period, which are more descriptive of compensation strategy than just 
pay level. Our hierarchical linear model (HLM) analyses showed that firms in the same industry 
segments tend to have similar levels of: (1) time orientation of employee compensation, and (2) 
the length of the stock option vesting period. These industry effects are significant even after 
controlling for other relevant economic and strategy variables. The findings are consistent with 
the institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) argument that 
organization structure becomes isomorphic. Using HLM, we demonstrated that both a firm's 
business strategy and industry membership simultaneously influence the firm's compensation 
strategy. Compensation strategies are relatively similar among firms in the same sub-industry; 
Strategic Compensation  CAHRS WP03-03 
                                         
 
 Page 25 
nevertheless, these firms still exhibit significant differences in their compensation strategies 
reflecting their business strategies.  
 The robust effects of innovation strategy on several aspects of compensation 
management suggest that compensation managers do take account of their firms' business 
strategies when they develop their firms' compensation systems. As argued by "fit" perspective, 
good fit is supposed to be positively associated with firm performance. For example, we expect 
that the combination of innovation strategy and "longer time orientation" will improve firm 
performance in the high-technology industry. Our potential future research is to empirically 
confirm whether such combination really improves firm performance. 
 Although this study focuses on high-technology firms, a comparison of the effect of 
innovation strategy on several dimensions of compensation management across other 
industries may be interesting. Balkin et al. (2000) did find the effect of innovation on CEO pay 
level was significant only in high-technology firms; the effect was positive but not significant in 
non high-technology firms. Given this result, we suspect that innovation does not influence the 
pay level for non-executive employees in non high-technology firms. On the other hand, the 
relationship between innovation strategy and internal pay structure, pay mix, and the lengths of 
the stock option vesting period may be applicable to other industries. Hence, replicating our 
analysis with a different industry sample will strengthen our argument. 
 One caveat is that we focused on innovation strategy. We believe this is a reasonable 
strategy dimension in high-technology firms. Yet, it is not the only effective strategy, and the 
examination of the relationship between other business strategies and compensation 
management would be beneficial. This issue is perhaps particularly relevant to firms that are not 
in the high-technology industry. The task of exploring relevant business strategies is still an 
unresolved issue for compensation researchers (Gerhart, 2000). 
 Another issue that needs to be addressed is the time period in which the research is 
conducted. We use data from 1997 to 2000, when the U.S. economy exhibited remarkable 
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performance, and so did high-technology firms. While our data is relatively recent as compared 
with other studies, in 2001 and after, the economy slowed substantially and many high-
technology firms suffered significant financial and market value losses. Analyzing the 
compensation data from 2001 or after may provide us with different insights on compensation 
management. 
 Finally, when examining the effect of business strategy on employee pay mix, we 
introduced a new concept, "time orientation." When we looked at employee compensation from 
the viewpoint of fit with innovation, we believe that this pay mix dimension is more relevant than 
other conventional pay mix measures. To bolster this finding, replicating past studies using this 
time orientation measure would be useful. 
 Despite these caveats, our study confirms that high-technology firms develop their 
compensation systems considering both their innovation strategy and the observable strategies 
of their product market competitors. Expanding our research framework to other industries will 
substantially improve our knowledge of strategic compensation. 
Strategic Compensation  CAHRS WP03-03 
                                         
 
 Page 27 
REFERENCES 
Anderson, M. C., Banker, R. D., & Ravindran, S. 2000. Executive compensation in the 
information technology industry. Management Science, 46: 530-547. 
Arora, A., Fosfuri, A., & Gambardella, A. 2001. Markets for technology: The economics of 
innovation and corporate strategy. Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press.  
Balkin, D., Markman, G. D., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. 2000. Is CEO pay in high-technology firms 
related to innovation? Academy of Management Journal, 43: 1118-1129. 
Barney, J. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of Management, 
17: 99-120 
Barringer, M. W., & Milkovich, G. T. 1998. A theoretical exploration of the adoption and design 
of flexible benefit plans: A case of human resource innovation. Academy of Management 
Review, 23: 305-324. 
Baysinger, B., Kosnik, R. D., & Turk, T. A. 1991. Effects of board and ownership structure on 
corporate R&D strategy. Academy of Management, 34: 205-214. 
Bloom, M. 1999. The performance effects on pay dispersion on individuals and organizations. 
Academy of Management Journal, 42: 25-40. 
Bloom, M., & Milkovich, G. T., 1998. Relationships among risk, incentive pay, and organizational 
performance. Academy of Management, 41: 283-297 
Carpenter, M.A., & Wade, J. B. 2002. Micro level opportunity structures as determinants of non-
CEO executive pay. Academy of Management, 45: 1085-1103 
Core, J. E., & Guay, W. R. 2001. Stock option plans for non-executive employees. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 61: 253-287. 
David, P., Hitt, M. H., & Gimeno, J. 2001. The influence of activism by institutional investors on 
R&D. Academy of management Journal, 44: 144-158. 
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. 1983. The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and 
collective rationality in organization fields. American Sociological Review, 48: 147-160. 
Ehrenberg, R. G., & Smith, R. 1997. Modern labor economics: Theory and public policy (8th ed.). 
Addison-Wesley. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. 1988. Agency- and institutional-theory explanations: The case of retail sales 
compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 31: 488-511. 
Ellig, B. 1981. Compensation elements: Market phase determines the mix. Compensation 
Review, Third quarter. 
Gerhart, B. 2000. Compensation strategy and organizational performance. In S. Rynes & B. 
Gerhart (Eds.) Compensation in organizations. San Francisco, CA. Jossey-Bass. 
Gerhart, B., & Milkovich, G. T. 1990. Organizational differences in managerial compensation 
and financial performance. Academy of Management Journal, 4: 663-691. 
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., & Balkin, D. B. 1992. Compensation, organizational strategy, and firm 
performance. Cincinnati, OH: South-Western. 
Hill, C. W., & Snell, S. A. 1988. External control, corporate strategy, and firm performance in 
research intensive industries. Strategic Management Journal, 9: 577-590. 
Hoskisoon, R. E., Hitt, M. A., & Hill, C. W. 1993. Managerial incentives and investment in R&D 
in large multiproduct firms. Organization Science, 4: 325-341. 
Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. H. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 4: 305-360. 
Kruger, A. B., & Summers, L. H. 1988. Efficiency wages and the inter-industry wage structure. 
Econometrica, 56: 259-293. 
Little, R. C., Miliken, G. A., Stroup, W. W., & Wolfinger, R. D. 2000. SAS system for mixed 
models. Cary, NC: SAS Institute. 
Marler, J. H., Milkovich, G. T., & Yanadori, Y. 2002. Organization-wide broad-base incentives: 
Rational theory and evidence. Best paper proceedings. Academy of Management. 
Strategic Compensation  CAHRS WP03-03 
                                         
 
 Page 28 
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. 1977. Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and 
ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83: 340-363. 
Miles, R. E., & Snow, C. C. 1978. Organizational strategy, structure, and process. New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Milkovich, G. T. 1988. A strategic perspective on compensation management. In Ferris (Ed.) 
Research in Personnel and Human Resource Management, 6: 263-288. Greenwich, CT. 
Milkovich, G. T., & Newman, J. 2002. Compensation (7th ed.). Homewood, IL: Irwin. 
Montemayor, E. F. 1996. Congruence between pay policy and competitive strategy in high-
performing firms. Journal of Management, 22: 889-908. 
National Center for Employee Ownership. 1998. Current practices in stock option plan design. 
Oakland, CA. 
National Center for Employee Ownership. 2001. Current practices in stock option plan design. 
Oakland, CA. 
Pitts, R. A. 1976. Diversification strategies and organizational policies of large diversified firms. 
Journal of Economics and Business, 8: 181-188.  
Pfeffer, J., & Davis-Blake, A. 1995. Understanding organizational wage structures: A resource 
dependence approach. Academy of Management Journal, 30: 437-455. 
Pfeffer, J., Davis-Blake, A., & Julius, D. J. 1995. AA officer salaries and managerial diversity: 
Efficiency wage or status? Industrial Relations, 34: 73-94. 
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. 1978. The external control of organizations: A resource 
dependence perspective, Maple Press. 
Porter, M., 1985. Competitive advantage. New York: Free Press. 
Singer, J. D. 1998. Using SAS PROC MIXED to fit multilevel models, hierarchical models, and 
individual growth models. Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics, 24: 323-355. 
Scherer, F. M., 1984. Innovation and growth: Schumpeterian perspectives, Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press 
Tolbert, P. S., & Zucker, L. G. 1996. Institutionalization of institutional theory. In S. Clegg, C. 
Hardy, & W. Nord (Eds.) Handbook of organization studies: 175-190. London, Sage.  
Vroom, V. 1964. Work and motivation. New York: Wiley. 
Werner, S., & Tosi, H. L. 1995. Other people's money: The effect of ownership on compensation 
strategy and managerial pay. Academy of Management Journal, 38: 1672-1691. 
Wiseman, R. M. Gomez-Mejia, L. R., & Fugate, M. 2000. Rethinking compensation risk. In S. 
Rynes & B. Gerhart (Eds.) Compensation in organizations. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-
Bass. 
Woodward, J. 1965. Industrial organization: Theory and practice, London. Oxford University 
Press. 
Wright, P. M., & McMahan, G. C. 1992. Theoretical perspectives for strategic human resource 
management. Journal of Management, 18: 295-320. 
Zenger, T. R., & Marshall, C. R. 2000. Determinants of incentive intensity in group-based 
rewards. Academy of Management Journal, 43: 149-163. 
                                                 
i
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic Compensation  CAHRS WP03-03 
                                         
 
 Page 29 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Endnotes 
 
________________________ 
 
i
 We do not include industry-level predictor. 
ii
 We use the following model.  
(Dependent variable)ijk = β0jk + β1jk (R&D Job)ijk + β2 (Job level)ijk + β3 (Tenure)ijk  + εijk 
β0jk = γ00jk + γ01jk(Firm size)jk + γ02jk(Firm performance)jk + γ03jk(Closing price)jk +  γ04jk(Cash flow)jk + 
γ05jk(Innovation)jk + U0jk
 
  γ00jk = τ + V00k  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
